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THE 'SYSTEMS' APPROACH TO COMMUNICATION

by Klaus Krippendorff
University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia

December, 1971

THE SYSTEMS APPROACH TO COMMUNICATION
by
Klaus Krippendorff
Un i ve r s ity of Pennsylvani a, Ph i ladelphia
Befor e getting to the substance of this paper, I would l ike to eliminate
thre e sources of possible misconceptions.
First, the reference to THE systems approach might create the impression
that there is only one way systems theorists and researchers approach
processes of communication .

This is far from be ing the case.

The s tudy

of systems has not yet deve l oped a unif i ed and everywhere accepted body
of theory and method.

One has to app r eciate the coexistence of several

systems theories a nd the stubborn persistence of many methodological
problems assoc i ated with systems analysis.

But I do f eel that a thread

connects the different sys tems theories and what t h ey have in common is
wha t will be my point of departure .
Second,

like

systems theory and research, the study of communica-

tion processesalso i s fa irly recent in natu r e .

It has obtained numerous

important impu l ses, fo r example, from theories i n electrical e ngineering ,
linguis t ics, journa l ism, genetics, organizat i on theory and psychotherapy,
but it has mainly flou r ished with attempts to so l ve practica l problems ,
such as optimizing information flows, findi ng corre l ations between mass
media performance and the emergence of social issues, improving human
relations or deve loping strategies for c hanges in individual behavior .
As a consequence, its body of theory is even l ess matur ed than that of
systems theory.

There are d isagreements

as to what the field i s about,
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as to which problems are to be tackled and as to which criteria are to
be used for evaluating possible solutions.

Because of this, many re-

searchers have found it difficult to abstract the process of communication from such material manifestations as the senders and receivers

between which it takes place, from the messages that are transformed in
the process or from the behavior that results from it.

Nevertheless

this is what I will have to assume to be feasable.
Third, acknowledging the coexistance of a variety of different
systems approaches and of a variety of problems considered in the study
of communication,I cannot do anything other than to present classifications, conceptual schemes and examples which show how knowledge about

sys terns can be transfered and utilized in studies of connnunication,and
which methods of inquiry into systems are also of interest to corrrrnunication
research.

Consequently, I am not concerned with reporting on or reviewing

a class of studies.

Rather, I shall attempt to order them so that the re-

lations that hold between them become transparent,

My aim is therefore

conceptual and perhaps programatic.
In the following I will discuss several concepts of system and associated modes of inquiry.

Then I will try to relate concepts of informa-

tion and communication as used by traditional communication scholars with
those implied by the different systems approaches.

In the course of this

discussion, I hope to show how systems approaches to the study of communication may enhance knowledge about human behavior, the behavior of large
scale social institutions and public welfare,

SYSTEMS

The te r m " system" has come to be used in so many differen t contexts,
tha t its meaning is qui t e variable.

Compa r e the meaning of: number sys-

tems, so l ar systems, c ommunication systems, open systems, sewage systems,
colonial systems, nervous systems, price systems, educational systems,
valu e systems, the periodic system, systems ana l ysis, systems i n gambling,
etc.

The term has become popu l ar in everyday discourse and, even in sales

arguments i ts use ranks regrettably high.

Let me try to settle the dif-

fe r ences not by adopting one definit i on and implicitly exclud i ng others
from consideration, but by presenting a t hree way classifica t ion of definitions of " systems " : r egar ding the ir re l at i ve rigor according to wh i ch they
are distingu ished as being e i ther " har d, " " sof t , " or "vague " ; r egarding their
epistemological pos i t i ons, that is, in reference to their implied " axiomatic",
" scientific, " or " praxiological" mode of inquiry and regarding whether they
delineate " static" or " dynamic " systems.
The r elative rigor of system definitions
Rapoport (1970) used a helpful dist inction between " hard" and " soft"
def in itions of system to which I will add t he category of " vague refe r ences"
for reasons t hat will become clear below.

A hard definition i s one that

permits an unambiguous identificat i on of the properties according to which
something does or does not belong to the class of things defined.
must be an explicit test with a yes or no ou tcome.

There

A soft definition, on

the othe r hand, provides only an intuitive approach to the definiens of
the defin ition.

The recognition

of the defining characteristics then

depends to a large extent on the ingenuity o f an observer and there may
be disagreements as to how these characteristics are to be interpreted.
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....
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A hard and in a sense minimal definition of system demands the following to be present:
(1)

A set of states (each of which must be individually identifiable and unambigously distinguishable relative to each other)

(2)

One or more transformations defined on at least
some of the set of states.

Examples include the algebraic operation of addition: here any two real
numbers are transformed into a third real number, the sum.
ation thus remains wholly within the set of real numbers.

The transformAnother example

is a phrase structure grammar: here strings of symbols are generated from
two sets, set of non-terminal symbols including an initial symbol and a
set of terminal symbols, and the transformation takes the form of several
rewrite rules which are applied on a string of symbols until it contains
only terminal symbols.

Transformations may be represented materially such

as in the wiring of a radio receiver with imputs, outputs and internal con-

ditions defining the states of the system.

Or they may be executable with

the help of mental operations, pencil, and paper, such as in deriving theorems from given axioms.

A corresponding soft definition of system would stress that there must
be
(1) Many constituent elements which have some property in common.
(2)

A structure, i.e., recognizable relationships
among the elements which are not reducible to
a mere accidental aggregation of elements
(Piaget, 1970)
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Soft definitions of this kind distinguish between systems and aggregates
by determining whether the properties of the whole is more than or exactly the sum of the properties of its parts.

The difference lies precisely

in whether there exist composition rules, laws or principles that impose
an order on the variety of elements over and above the collection of individual properties.
constituent
the group.

A social group provides a good example.

All of its

members have at least the common property of belonging to
In addition, one should expect at least some "pecking order",

some division of labor if not a network of formal roles assigned to each
member that holds the group together.Social groups are probably too complex to be studied in terms of the hard definition of system because the
states each can take and the transformations that account for their behavior are not easily specificable without ambiguity.Therefore,

the social

sciences often rely on soft definitions of system even though the hard
one would 6e preferable.
It should be noted that the components that go into the soft definition of system are implied by the hard definition but the inverse is
not true.

The soft definition recognizes many elements.

By its own,

each constituent element may assume any of a set of states.

Their joint

states would have to be described as vectors or as many-tuples.

The

hard definition of system now requires that a transformation be defined
at least on some of the possible vectors so that some vectors imply
others.

The soft definition demands that the transformation be such

that the resulting relationships between elements is not reducible to
an aggregate.

A simple example might illustrate the case.

If the
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e l ements of a system are so r e l ated t hat the total exceeds the sum of
its parts t h e n one should expect the system to consis t of some tr ans fo rmation 0 for which

0 (a+b+c)

0 (a) + 0 (b) + 0(c)

This is satisfied , fo r example, by

(a+b+c)

2

The differe nce lies in the interaction terms, 2ab, 2ac and 2bc which
accoun t for "recognizable relationship among the elements" , that is req uired by
the soft defin ition of systems , Needless t o say, the hard def in i tion
pe r mits consideration o f many transformations not all of which may imply
t he relationships stipu l ated in the soft definition of system.

The

hard definition of systems therefore has a wider scope and includes the
systems according to the soft defin ition as a special case.

Soft defi -

nitions are more oriented towards existing complexes while hard definitions
include al l conceivable complexes.

On the other hand, g i ven the emp irical

fact that it is difficu lt to treat very complex objects of interest such as
beehives,social institutions , international communities by mathemat i cal
models that satisfy the hard definition, soft definitions of systems open
the way to methodical investigations of a c lass of complex objects otherwide
inaccessab l e .
Vague references to systems prevail most l y in co lloquial but also in
po l itica l discourses.

I th ink a ll such references intuitively recognize

..

-7that there are
(1)

a large number of constituent elements
(individuals, rules, institutions, etc.)
not all of which are clearly identifiable.

(2)

complex forms of interrelations among them
which defy understanding in detail giving
nevertheless the appearance of wholeness
and unity.

The classical notion of organism with the defining dogma that any analysis would destroy it, is a case in point.

The attitude is exemplified

in such assertions as "you can't change the system."

The term

11

system"

here is likely to refer to some all-powerful :supra-individual complex of
integrated political-social-economic behaviors which is regarded as invariant to individual actions.

In most cases not even an intuitive under-

standing of the relationships that account for the apparent stability of
the complex is attempted.

Vague references to systems are common in many

ideological discussions, for example, on "the communist system" or oi:l

"the class system".

Such discussions recognize the unity of the complex

being referred to and tend to associate it with a few abstract traits without being able to understand how both are the consequence of the transformation defined on or the interactions between the constituents of the system.
Also most of these discussions take place on such a level of abstraction
that it is not entirely clear what the constituent elements of the system
are.

Vague references to systems attest to the inability of its user to

specify - even by way of a soft definition - what the system under consideration consists of.
expressed.

Only a feeling of some hidden complexity is thereby
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Static Systems - Dynamic Systems
The systems as defined above are static and concern

configu-

rations of states and re lat ions among constituent elements without
reference to time.

The examples given reflect this notion.

However,

the more important classes of systems involve some kind of behavior,
i.e., changes over time.

Accordingly, the hard definition of dynamic

system requires in addition to the two requirements that
(3)

The transformation is defined on states at
different points in time so that states at a
given point in time imply states at some
future point in time.

Thus the behavior of a system is specified by a succession of states.
Soft definitions of dynamic system usually emphasize three typical
consequences of transformations.

They recognize the fact that nearly

all living things, organizations or societies possess a structure, as

in (2) ,and,· in addition
(3)

A behavior or a function, i.e., they show
efforts to maintain a short-term steady
state at which some essential structure,
the "identity" of the system, remains in-

variant (a) in spite of changes in elements,
cells or membership that go on within them
and (b) in spite of changes in the environment with which they interact, and
(4)

A history, i.e., they undergo slow, long-term
changes in those structures, i.e., they grow,
develop, evolve or degenerate, disintegrate,
die.

As Rapoport points out, the soft definition of dynamic system is an idealization of the concept of organism,

"Organisms, ecologic a 1 systems, nations,
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institutions all have these three attributes: structure, function, and
history; or, if you will, being, acting and becoming" (1970:22).
Static systems like a logic, a language or a geometrical figure,
do not act but certainly possess structure.

On the other hand, static

systems rarely occur without a dynainic one: a system of logic is manipulated by a mathematician, a language evolves within a culture, certain
visual configurations are created by an artistic movement.And one can

at once see the possibility of studying the mechanisms that maintain
consistency, correct usage

and aesthetic appearance and the history

that lead to the current state of affairs,

Modes of Inqu i ry

Systems approaches are peculiarly intertwined with epistomo l ogy,
i.e., with the way knowledge is obtained and validated.

There are def-

i nitions that make a system a mathematical object without explicit or
implied relation to any portion of the real world.

For example, a logical

system, an algebra, a calculus, or a set of recursive functio ns.

To a

mathematician, such systems are acceptab l e as valid only if they are consistent.

Whether such systems predict some behavior is quite secondary

to him.

Sys t ems that are denoted by the hard definition do not require

observations eit her though it is entir ely possible that t hey conform to
available data.

The system prope r ties of interest to mathematicians are

all implied by the transformations which are applied on some initial configuration of symbols, most of which are written on paper.

The deduction

of theorems from axi oms, t he algebraic partition i ng of quantities according
to a calculus, the derivation of solutions from sets of linear equations
are all examples of the axiomatic mode of inquiry into systems .
On the other hand, there are definitions - and the above soft definition of system may be considered one of them - that seek to locate system
in the real world.

The l a nguage in terms of which such - usually material -

systems are described, is then regarded as somewhat secondary to or as only
an abstr action from " objectively" existing characteristics.

Systems that

are defined in terms of "many interacting parts, exhibiting a j oint behavior
that is not pred ictab l e from the behaviors of the individual parts" attest
to the frequent assumption that their existence is prior to observation,
description and comprehension.

Also research aimed at comparing " communi-
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cation systems" of different societies (Lerner, 1960), for example,
assumes that their difference will lie in the real world, not in the
properties of their respective models.

While there is no need to

share the implied ontological claim, such operations as data processing, hypothesis testing experimentation, model building always
make the acceptance of a system as valid dependent on whether a particular symbolic representation, a model, is predictive of observable
states of affairs however complex they may be.

This is the mode of

inquiry of all predictive sciences.
There is finally a large class of definitions that seek to identify
systems not only in a portion of the real world but stress in addition the
requirement that they serve some specified purpose.

For example, according

to Forrester's usage "a'system' means a grouping of parts that operate

together for a common· purpose"(l968:l-1) or, according to Gibson, a system
is "an integrated assembly of interacting elements designed to carry out
cooperatively a predetermined function" (1962:215).

Such definitions reveal

the typical engineering approach to the real world.

It is therefore not

surprising that the Systems Science and Cybernetics Group of the Institute
of Electrical and Electromic Engineers (IEEE) designates its own domain as
"the scientific theory and methodology that is common to all large collections
of interacting functional units that together achieve a defined purpose"
(Rowe, 1965).

In the introduction of a book on systems and human engineering

by DeGreene, the same definitional attitude is

adopted:

Many workers do not consider as systems those natural

-12organizations or structures that lack purpose,
where purpose is construed to be the discharge
of some function. For example, minerals can be
classified into one of six systems (nalite into
the cubic system and calcite into the hexagonal
system); however some authors (Gerardin, 1968)
argue that crystals cannot be said to form a
system,because they perform no function, are
end-products in themselves, and do not change
except by application of external force (DeGreene,
1968: 7) .... Most people will agree that a man is
a system and that a submarine is a system and that
each can be characterized in terms of certain properties; most also will agree that a single perceptual motor action is not a system and that an electron is not a system, On the other hand, many will
disagree as to whether a crystal or a city is a
system, primarily because of differing conceptions
of purpose ... (DeGreene, 19~:ll).

10
For man-made systems in the broader sense, i.e. when the problem is one of
optimizing a given organization with re~pect to a certain set of variables,

when the problem is one of designing novel hardware configurations or when
the problem is one of linking up man, machines and administrations to form
new integral units, the notion of purpose, of mission, is clearly significant.But when one tries to comprehend as systems, living organisms, large
scale social organizations such as an ant hill or a government, or mechanisms

of technological growth, the~ priori imposition of a purpose may be pre·
mature,

As it turns out, whenever this kind of systems concept is applied

to such existing complexes as listed above, the attributed purposes are
rarely free of anthropocentric attitudes or of hidden ideological comrid.tments,
neither of which serve to make the object of analysis transparent,

This

is incidentally the prime objection raised against Parson's (1951) systems
theory of society by his critics (e,g.Berghe, 1961).

Thus, this kind of

systems definition puts the researcher in the epistomological position of

l
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a judge or of an acting participant whose objective is to evaluate or
control a portion of the real world and who accepts knowledge as valid
whenever it is not only consistent and predictive but also in conformity
with his own objective.

Observable complexes that do not serve a useful

function or cannot be made to serve one, are, as has been pointed out by

DeGreene, excluded. •from this typical engineering or activist approach to
real world phenomena.
To put these implicit epistomological differences between the three
classes of systems definitions in context, let me use a scheme (Krippen.-.
dorff, 1969), initially proposed by Smith (1962), for distinguishing modes
of inquiry for general systems analysis.

Figure I will make the crucial

differences between praxiological, scientific and axiomatic modes of inquiry

Figure I about here
clear.

The formal mathematical study of systems is obviously associated

with the axiomatic mode of inquiry and relies exclusively on the hard definition of system,

Those activities that are aimed at observing, understand-

ing, and predicting delineated aspects of real world phenomena belong to the
scientific mode.

Here, purpose enters at best as an intrinsic property of

the systems as .described.

In addition to the hard definition of system,

the soft definition, which is derived from the study of such integrated
wholes as biological organisms and social organigations, is common to this
mode of inquiry.

Those activities that aim at modifying or creating a

Kind of knowledge
produced

Criteria
of validity

Likely
system concept

Axiomatic

Formal systems,
their mathematical
properties and the
homomorphisms
between them

Consistency

Mathematical object

Scientific

System models of
particular portions
of the real world

Consistency
predictability

Real objects that
are describable in
a system language
and thereby subject
to tests

Pr axiological

Designs for material
compositions, plans
or strategies for
purposive actions
on an environment of
interacting parts

Consistency
p redictablity
utility

Real objects that
are describable in
a system l anguage
and at least to some
extend controlable
or reproducable

Mode of inquiry

Three Modes of Inqui ry for General Systems Analysis
Figure 1
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portion of the real world belong to the praxiological mode of inquiry.
It is the approach taken by designers, engineers, planners, political
activists etc.

who may employ hard or soft definitions as well as rely

on vague references to systems.

It should be appreciated that the disagreements regarding what a
system is are not merely verbal but based on fundamentally different
epistemological positions relative to the real world and on different
objectives for research.

Each has a justifiable existence of its own.

To illustrate the three-way classification so far proposed, Figure 2
attempts to give some examples of systems as viewed from different
perspectives.

Figure 2 about here

Soft Definition

Hard Definition
(1) a set of states
(2) one or more transformations
defined on those states
(3) transformation
over time
Static Systems
Axiomatic
Mode of
Inquiry

a formal language
a logic
an algebra
a calculus

Scientific
Mode of
Inquiry

Pr axiological
Mode of
Inquiry

(1) many elements with common
p roperty
(2) a structure relating these
elements
(3) a behavior
(4) a history
Static Systems

Dynamic Systems

Vague References
(1) a large number of
constituent units
(2) complex forms of
interaction which
defy understanding
in detail

Dynamic Systems

a set of linear
equations
recursive functions
(automata theory)
stochastic communication theory
(Shannon)

the periodic system a model of the
national economy
a color system
a model of urban
a system of kinship growth (Forrester)
terms (Goodenough)
a simulation model
a network of defini
tions (in Webster) of human cognition

information dis p lay a working data
of early warning
retrieval system
system
spe cial purpose
computer
a file system ,
a telephone book ,
the componemts
a switching
involved i n
diagram
sateli t e
communication
a data bank

the audience (for the
actor)

natural language
a system of
meanings

the dynamics of a
city, of a bee hive , etc .

"Man ag ainst Syste ms"
(A book on Sovie t Russia)

informal rules of
proper conduct

communication
within a social
institution

g estalts on a
photograph

an ecology

a system of
traffic signs

t h e mass media
(for law makers)

configurations
of consumer
attitudes

the capitalist s y stem
t h e cognitive
dynamic .of psychi~ (for the revolutionary)
atri c patients
t h e audience ( f or the
a computer center actor)
as seen by its
manager

a set of verbal
instructions

Examples of Objects , Viewed as Systems from Different Persp e ctives
Figure 2

a se t of drawings
(for the artist)

NON-SYSTEMS APPROACHES
I mentioned the condition unde r which the three epistomological
pos itions respectively accept certain kinds of knowledge as valid and
thereby exclude certain objects as unworthy of study.

This seems en-

tirely general and not a characteristic of systems approaches alone.
To appreciate what distinguishes systems approaches from others let me
give a few examples of research strategies that are e ither excluded from
systems conside rations or regarded as of l ess interest.
The first example is found in attempts to isolate~ single and
often unique event and to describe it from various different perspecthose
tives. This is the approach of historians who contribute to knowledge
A

by searching out the many ways a particular historical even t may be interpreted or by e laborating on one such i n terp r etation so as to gain
maximum possible depth.

While judgements regarding whether an interpre-

tation makes sense is presumably cognitively linked to the interpretations
of other, possibly similar, historical events, each such contribution to
knowledge then stands relatively isolated.

In chosing this example I do not

wish to imply that historians refuse to describe successions of states and
evolutionary processes as a consequence of the interact ion between the components
of a system.

I merely argue that a confinement to the study of isolated events_

however many dimensions may be considered i·n each case and in
· wh'ic h ever discipline
this strategy is adopted- will not aid the understanding of how such events are
related to other events, how they come about and to what they will lead in the f uture .
A second examp l e is found in attempts to single out for attention one
£E._ ~ observed variables and to try to understand their variation in terms

of their dependencies on another set of observed variables .
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This is the
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approach common to much of traditional sociological research with its
conceptual distinction between "dependent 11 and "independent" variables

and in much of psychological research involving experimental designs
with its synonymous distinction between "criterion" and "predictor"

variables.

While this methodology clearly recognizes many variables

and possibly many relations holding between them, by preconceiving the
direction of the possible explanations, causal or otherwise, interaction

and mutual causal dependencies can hardly be discovered and the kind of
system properties which underly the observed behavior are likely to be
missed.

A corolary to this is the attempt i.n much experimental work to

hold constant as many variables as possible and to vary only one at a
time.

This is a method which reduces the complexity of an object of study by

forcing possible complex interactions out of existence.

A third example for what a systems approach would exclude or regard as
of less interest is found in attempts to reduce~ obviously complex organism

El.

analysis into certain individually comprehensible units without regard

to the relationships among them.

This has been clearly observed by Ashby who

writes:

... for two hundred years (science) has tried primarily
to find, within the organism, whatever is simple. Thus,
from the whole complexity of spinal action, Sherrington
isolated the stretch reflex, a small portion of the whole,
simple within itself and capable to being studied in functional isolation. From the whole complexity of digestion,
the biochemist distinguished the action of pepsin or protein,which could be studied in isolation. And avoiding
the whole complexity of cerebral action, Pavlov investigated the salivary conditioned reflex - as essentially simple
function,only a fragment of the whole, that could be studied
in isolation.

-17The same strategy - of looking for the simple part has been used incessantly in physics and chemistry,
Their triumphs have been chiefly those of identifying the units out of which the complex structures
are made-.--(Ashby, 1958:1)
Thus, we know more about the nerve fibers of which the brain is made
than about the properties of the mind.

We have more and clearer concep-

tions for dealing with human individuals than for social organizations of
which they are a part and through which they derive their significance.
We have mastered the design, production and control of cars but we fail
to understand the car complex which involves many industries, the network
of public roads and the masses of drivers.
It should be noted that these examples are predominantly taken from
the scientific mode of inquiry as delineated above.
do the same for the praxiological mode.

It would be easy to

Books on system engineering and

management are full of illustrations for how the systemic consequences of
an improvement can lead to fantastic failures, the current ecological
problems caused by excessive industrialization being a case in point.
These examples all boil down to the fact that whenever many component,
parts are interacting with each other to form a larger whole, the complexity that does emerge can be handled neither by in depth understanding of
isolated events,

nor

by selectively controlling the variation of a

few "independent" variables, nor by functionally isolating its constituent
parts.

Such strategies would presumably be avoided by systems approaches.

Let me add three more negative examples of systems approaches, now more
specifically from the field of communication research,

Lasswell's conception

of communication research may serve as a starting point, and it should be noted
that he has been one of the most influential writers in the field.

Lasswell
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argues:
A convenient way to describe an act of communication is to answer the following questions:

Who
Says What
In Which Channel
To Whom
With What Effect?
The scientific study of the process of communication tends to concentrate upon one or another of
these questions. Scholars who study the "who,"
the communicator, look into the factors that initiate and guide the act of communication. We
call this subdivision of the field of research
control analysis. Specialists who focus upon the
"says what" engage in content analysis. Those who
look primarily at the radio, press, film, and
other channels of corrnnunication are doing media
analysis. When the principal concern is with the
person reached by the media, we speak of audience
analysis. If the question is the impact upon
audiences, the problem is effect analysis,
Whether such distinctions are useful depends entirely upon the degree of refinement which is regarded as appropriate to a given scientific and
managerial objective. Often it is simpler to
combine audience and effect analysis, for instance,
than to keep them apart. On the other hand, we may
want to concentrate on the analysis of content, and
for this purpose subdivide the field into the study
of purport and style, the first referring to the
message, and the second to the arrangement of the
elements of which the message is composed. (Lasswell,
1960).
This strategy proposes not only a particular unitization of the process in terms of sender, message, channel, receiver and effects - but it also

suggests that an understanding of the process is obtainable by studying each
unit separately.

From the point of view of systems theory there is nothing

wrong either with a particular unitization or with studying these units
independently of each other,

Also that the terms refer to units on differ-
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ent levels of analysis (sender and receiver are the parts of a system,
the channel is a binary relation between them, the effects are presumably measured on the receiver, etc.) is not objectionable. However, if
does have
the notion of communication process
some wholistic qualities, some
supra-individual properties as many communication researchers would

contend, then a research strategy which observes each unit separately
could not possibly gain insights into the very properties of communication processes.

It would at best discover certain primitive correlates

of the process without coming to grips with what in fact accounts for it.
A second negative example comes from the same school of thought.

It

is an attempt by Lerner to compare communication systems (his term) across
different societies.

Instead of describing the systems either in terms of

transformations, states, relations between any of their component parts or

in terms of their wholistic properties, he is satisfied merely with giving
names to certain units:

Units

Media Systems

Oral Systems

Channel

Media (Broadcast)

Oral (Point to Point)

Audience

Mass (Heterogeneous)

Primary (Homogeneous)

Source

Professional (Skill)

Hieractical (Status)

Content

(Descriptive)

(Prescriptive)
(Lerner, 1960)

This is neither to say that such comparisons would not provide interesting
insights, nor is it intended to claim that communication technologies could
not constitute or be constituent parts of large systems, but the way such
"systems" are described does not lend itself to any study of their properties.
what is described here are a few aspects or dimensions of some "system" that is

vaguely conceptualized and lies outside the researcher to be discovered in the real
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world.

The data that are gathered in such cases do not lend themse l ves t o an

analysis of the objects as systems, rather, they are at be st real corre lates of
systems properties and are thus fa r removed from the systems under consideration.
A third example, a l so taken from Lasswell (1960) ,comes a bi t c l oser
t o a systems approach.

It is possible, Lasswell argues, to take acts of

connnunication as the units of ana l ysis - thereby r ender ing the constituent
components as l ess important - and to study the fu nctions of these ac t s
within the context of a society.

Just as particu l a r organs o f an organism

are assigned several roles or a r e specialized to perform certain tasks,
so can acts of communication be ass i gned certain responsibilities.

This

interpretation comes c loser to a systems approach because at least an
attempt is made to relate various units of ana lysis, he r e acts of communi cation involving se nders and receivers, and certain other social activities
with each other.

However it differs from a systems approach because these

relations are spec i fied not in terms of interactions f r om which some behavior may be concluded, not i n terms of transforma t ions which would specify
how some events imply othe r s, etc.

These relations have primarily cogn itive

significance. They rende r the existence of each unit meaningfu l to the
obser ve r o r to the par t icipant of the socia l process by the ass umption of a
shared purpose.

Lasswel l takes for g r anted, for example, that some t hing

like " rationality in society" is a value towar d which communication is to be
employed.

He ass umes that communicat i on is to serve " the maintenance of

c ul tural heritage " and " the correlation of the various units of society with
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each other."

He thereby ignores the possibility that communication may

also highten emotionality, selectively destroy such heritage, or contribute
to conflicts all of which may well be socially creative.
It is not the issue here to question the ideological underpinnings of
Lasswell's conceptual frames of reference, rather, the example is chosen
to demonstrate that this form of integrating the units of analysis is
merely cognitive and derived from some purpose superimpo$ed upon the whole.
The explanation, while subjectively highly meaningful, has neither
imp.lications, nor predictive value.

formal logical

SYSTEMS APPROACHES TO INFORMATION
After giving a few examples of research strategies that systems
approaches would presumably avoid, I would like to take a more positive
stance and show the kind of knowledge that such approaches could conceivably provide.

Let me start by illustrating how various systems approaches

would conceptualize information.

Deutsch provides a particularly clear

description.
Generally, information can be defined as a patterned
distribution,or a patterned relationship between
events. Thus the distribution of lights and shadows
in a landscape may be matched by the distribution of
a set of electric impulses in a television cable,
by the distribution of light and dark spots on a
photographic plate, or on a television'set, or by
the distribution of a set of numbers if a mathematician had chosen to assign coordinates to each
image point. In the case of photography or television. the processes carrying this information are
quite different from each other: sunlight, the
emulsion on the photographic plate, the electric
impulses in the cable, the television waves, the
surface of the receiving screen. Yet each of these
processes is brought into a state that is similar
in significant respects to the state of the other
physical processes that carried the image to it.
A sequence of such processes forms a channel of
communication, and information is that aspect of the
state description of each stage of the channel that
has remained invariant from one stage to another.
That part of the state description of the first
stage of the channel that reappears invariant at
the last stage is then the information that has
been transmitted through the channel as a whole.
(Deutsch, 1963: 146-147)
From a mathematical point of view, this concept of information is
equivalent to a particular state of a static system, i.e., a configuration of elements, a pattern or a set of relations which is invariant over
time under the repeated application of some transformation.
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Deutsch there-
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by emphasizes implicity what communication theorists often wish to make
explicit, that the concept of information is related to a variety of
possibilities, for example, a selection of one message out of several
conceivable ones, one linguistic expression out of several logically

acceptable ones, one of several possible states.

In other words, only

in the context of several possible patterns is the one actually sent,
transmitted, received or stored meaningful.

Deutsch also defines a

channel of communication as a transformation maintaining at least the

principal features of information.

He thereby recognizes the empirical

fact that information rarely exists in isolation from processes that may
alter the pattern, whereby destruction or maintenance are but special
cases.But it is possible to abstract from such processes and to describe
as static systems the complex patterns that are subjected to such transformations and this is what the systems approach to information essentially
entails.
Actually, the axiomatic mode of inquiry into information is so highly
developed that it defies a complete account.

It has at its disposal vir-

tually all moderately complex mathematical structures.

Let me mention just

two,graph theory and stochastic information theory as examples of an algebra
and a calculus respectively.
In graph theory, the basic elements are nodes and the relations
are links between any two such nodes.

Often depicted as lines between two

points, a collection of such links is called a graph and can have the appearance of all kinds of networks, trees, lattices, chains, circles, etc.

When

the links are acs•;y=etrical,often depicted by arrows, the graph is called
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directed, when the links are assigned values (numbers, positive or negative signs, etc.) the graphs are called signed.

A large number of

theorems have been developed exhibiting various properties of graphs,
or mathematical operations that hold between them.

Each graph can be

regarded as information provided that the restrictions accepted for the
particular mathematical structure allows variation, i.e., more than one

graph is well formed.
Stochastic information theory is essentially a calculus of variation
which allows to algebraically decompose a quantity, called entropy.
tropy is directly related to the variety of possible elements.

En-

More

specifically, it is a function of the probability of such elements and
thereby measures that property of information,which may be interpreted
as the average number of decisions needed to specify a particular element
or the average number of yes and no questions that need to be answered by
a message in order to reduce a given uncertainty, etc.

In offering interpretations of this kind we leave the domain of
pure syntactical concerns with consistency as sole criteria of validity
and enter the scientific mode of inquiry which seeks explanations and
prediction of observable phenomena.

Graphs can represent the logical

structure of arguments with nodes interpreted as statements and the a~
symmetrical links interpreted as implications.

Graphs can represent the

tree-structures that underlie the generation of a sentence for non-terminal
to terminal symbols by rewrite rules.
ture memory of a computer.

Graphs can represent the list struc-

Graphs can represent the network of sociometric

-25choices among friends.

Graphs can represent associative or dissociative

connections between attitudes, etc.

All these examples, are treated as

static systems with many elements and some transformation, the set of

links, defined on them.

Once information is cast in those terms a host

of systems properties may be found, for example, density of connection,
completeness, clusters, connection between clusters1 "bottle necks",

circularities (tautologies), balance-imbalance.

I will refrain from

listing examples of uses of the stochastic theory of information.

This

calculus is well known in management sciences, psychology, electrical
engineering, and very many other scientific endeavors.

On the praxiological level one emphasizes successful manipulation,
measurable improvement or new designs over and above considerations of

prediction.

Thus the objects of concern can be to make more efficient such

"memories" as materialized in public libraries, in the file organization of

bureaucracies, in the forms that circulate within a social organization,

in data banks accessable by computer or in neuronal configurations of the
human brain.

The design of facilities for the recording, storing, processing

and displaying of information is another aim of praxiological modes of inquiry.
A direct result of developments in stochastic information theory is the availability of theorems according to which efficient codes for transforming information can be constructed.

The theory also suggests certain absolute limita-

tions for manipulating information which has considerable implications for
praxiology in general.

The use of graph theory in constructing data storages

and in evaluating search processes relative to informational pattern could
provide an even more impressive list of examples of systems approaches to
information.

-26Thus, in contrast to research strategies that focus on a single
message or that measure some over-all quality of several messages
(and thereby deal with them as one undifferentiated unit), systems
approaches to information are more inclined to look at the possible
connections between a number of units.

Such connections may be

specified algebraically, algorithmically or probablistically and on
the basis of such relations over-all systemic properties may well be
deduced.

Of particular interest are languages.

Languages impose

complex constraints on the configuration of symbols and the legitimate
expressions of a language are equivalent to the states of a static system.
Data languages, for example, in terms of which scientific data are recorded and stored for further analysis are usually formal languages and
thus conform to the hard definition of static systemi. But it might well
be possible to store data in the non-formal language of a source and later
formalize the available information by means of some kind of content
analysis.

Here then one is concerned with coding a relatively rich, pos-

sibly ambiguous, and usually incompletely specifiable natural language
(which can be regarded as a system according to the soft definition of
system at best) into a selectively simple, hopefully unambiguous but computable formal language.

The specification

of successful coding instruc-

tions is a typical praxiological aim of research.

The comprehension of how

various people would accomplish this task is a typical scientific aim,
whereas the mere study of the syntactical or semantical homomorphisms between the two languages may be an aim of the axiomatic mode of inquiry
into information.

----,
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I should like to emphasize again that the mere recognition that
certain messages, objects or markers constitute "a complex interlinked

whole" is not sufficient for systems approaches to provide significant
insights.

For example, when it is the task to study the coordination

across different communication channels of the contents in an advertisement

campaign, then the res.earcher cannot just analyze each channe 1 separately
or count particular symbols as if they could be treated as independent
units.

He needs a representational device, formal or at least somewhat

formalized to record the phenomena in their actual complexity.

Otherwise

references to information systems, message systems, etc. become vague and

in the end indefensible,

It is one thing to intuitively recognize a

gestalt in a set of colored dots and quite a different thing to spell out and
to'' describe the order that accounts for this perception.

Mixing up the

colored dots ( or equivalently, counting their relative frequencies) would
certainly not help the understanding of an apparent wholeness.

SYSTEMS APPROACHES IQ. COMMUNICATION

The above quotation by Deutsch indicates the intricate relation
between information and communication.

In fact, when one speaks of

information systems one rarely excludes from consideration those transformations or hardware configurations which decompose, recombine, maintain,

delete, retrieve or recode information from larger storages - from the
circulation within confined boundaries or from past records.

These trans-

formations involve time, describe behavior over time and thereby constitute
dynamic systems.

Deutsch labeled those transformations that maintain pat-

terns of events channels of communication. Generalizing the idea, we can

interpret all transformations of information involving time (and possibly
space) as processes of communication, whether they occur within one (e.g.,
thinking, memorizing) or between different organisms ( e.g., transmission,
dynamic interdependence), whether they maintain information or alter it,
whether they involve human beings, machines or societies.
From a mathematical point of view, communication is a property of

dynamic systems.

While one can, according to Deutsch, interpret.

any

transformation of information as a channel of communication, what makes

the axiomatic mode of inquiry into dynamic systems particularly powerful
is that such a transformation may be decomposed without loss into partial
transformations within and among the component parts of a system, i.e.,
into a set of dynamic subsystems and int:o a network of communication
channels among them which, taken together, account for the behavior of
the whole system.

If the transformation of the whole can be regarded as

a mere aggregate or composite of the transformations within its parts, then
communication between these parts is absent. As a primitive example, consider
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the transformation defined on the values of Z:

If the system is composed of three parts, A, B, and C, and their respective
values are related to the whole by:
z

a+b+c

and if it can be shown that:

then A and Bare independent from each other and from C, while both communicate
with the latter.

The communication implied by this transformation can be

depicted as follows:

The arrows to C represent the remaining partial transformation;

Incidentally, as a channel of communication, the system has two points of
stability, at z=O and at z=l, where it reliably maintains the pattern
(a,b,c):

(O,O,O), (0,0,1), (0,1,0), (l,O,O),

And it might be noted that the

mathematical theory of communication would assess this channel to have a

-30-

transmission capacity of two bits of information.
An example of a system without communication among its component parts
is given in the fol l owing transformation of values o f Z:

•

•
Provided that, when references to t he three components are introduced as
before, it can be shown to be fully decomposab l e into three summatively
equivalent transformations of values of A, B, and C:

-·
... -

fi

2at

at+l
(a+b+c)t+l = 2 (a+b+c) t

implies

bt+l
ct+l

=

2bt
2ct

If this were to be the case than it must be conc l uded that the components a r e
isolated f r om each other, nothing is transmitted across, al l effects remain
wit_h in each component, and consequent l y communication is absent.
Although this example is too simple to lend itself to interesting real
life

interpretations , it serves to demonstrate how the mathematical idea of

communication emerges in the process of decomposition.

Whenever it can be

shown that effects between a set of components at one point in time and that
set of components at another point in time are confined within each component,
no evidence for connnunication exists.

Converse l y, when an attempted decomposition

would result in losses of specificity, communication as an explanatory construct
is indispensible.

When such transformations are interpreted as channels of

communication - as Deutsch is suggesting - one can say that the axiomatic
systems approach provides rigorous procedures to decompose a comple x channe l of
communication into the channels within and among each component part of t he
system.

-

Systems theory and connnunication theory are thereby shown to be c oextensive .
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In the scientific mode of inquiry, with its emphasis on predictability
and adequate representation of real world phenomena, communication is likely
to be conceptualized in terms of the conditionality over time of one part
of an observable complex on another.

Thus, when the ideas that someone

possesses can only be explained by recourse to someone else's prior linguistic

behavior, then communication must be said to have taken place,

When no such

explanation is justified, the relation of communication is empty,

When the

presence or absence of an event at one point in space imposes some constraint
on the subsequent occurance of events at another point in space, then

communication is the suitable basis for explanation, its diret.tion being the
direction of time as well as that in space,

In its most simple form, the

answer to the question: "Who says what to whom and with what effect" involves
the account of a communication process provided that the answers to all of
the question's components are conjoined.

What the systems approach to communication adds to this elementary notion
of communication is a methodology for dealing not with one communication
link at a time but with a large number of them simultaneously, not with
binary communication relations between a single sender and a single receiver
but with many-valued relations among a possibly large number of communicators,
not with one-way processes of communication but with interaction and complex
circular flows.

Once it is established that a particular system is a model

of a portion of the real world, the system can be analysed and subjected to
numerous formal tests.

Communication is just one of many

properties of

dynamic systems.
The significance of communication as an explanatory construct for complex
social systems has been expressed by Wiener:

-32The existence of Social Science is based on the ability to treat a
social group as an organization and not as an agglomeration, Communication is the cement that makes organizations.

Communication

alone enables a group to think together, to see together, and to act
together. All sociology requires the understanding of communication,
What is true for the unity of a group of people, is equally true for
the individual integrity of each person. The various elements which
make up each personality are in continual connnunication with each
other and affect each other through control mechanisms which themselves have the nature of .communication.

Certain aspects of the theory of communication have been considered
by the engineer. While human and social communication are extremely
complicated in comparison to the existing patterns of machine
communication, they are subject to the same grammar; and this grammar
has received its highest technical development when applied to the
simpler content of the machine, (Deutsch, 1963: 77)
But in spite of this agreed upon significance, one cannot hide the fact that
the complexity of observable situations often exceeds the capacity of
available mathematical systems methodology,

And in the face of this

methodological lag, scientists who wish to understand at least something
about social organization have chosen different strategies of which I will
discuss three,

The first one is the attempt to isolate units that can be

conveniently studied,

I have criticized this strategy earlier and I am

afraid to say that communication research has largely resorted to this
approach by assuming the basic unit to be a binary communication relation
between sender and receiver.

The study of mass communication as a one-way

flow of messages from an institutionalized source to a mass audience is a

prime example of isolating an object of study for the sake of convenience
with little regard for the systemic context of the process.

What is needed

in such a situation are studies that look simultaneously at many channels
of communication and deduce some interesting system properties from it,
one of which may well be the purpose toward which the whole system seems
to be oriented regardless of the will of the human components of the system,
The second strategy of coping with unmanageable complexity is

to
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abandon the idea of detailed predictions and thereby gain models of
certain abstract parameters of the observable complexes.

Statistical

characterizations of communication processes provide typical examples
for this strategy.

The stochastic theory of communication can be interpreted

as a calculus for multivariate causes.

On the basis of their distributions,

predictions regarding quantitative limitations of channels of communication
and control, regarding time required for processing particular forms of
information, regarding tolerable levels of noise within a channel, etc.
can be ascertained.

I should mention that contrary to common applications,-

this calculus is not limited to binary communication.

As Ashby (1969) has

shown, quantities of multivariate transmission provide very powerful
concepts for analysing information flows in complex systems,
Another example of this strategy is to develop indices of a variety
of measurable properties and observe, and describe or postulate the
transformation that these indices might follow over time.
take this approach quite explicitly.

Economic models

Recently, Rapoport (1969) suggested

this strategy to account for the behavior of the large corpuses of verbal
output that societies produce.

Presumably one would find that such corpuses

respond to social changes or slowly evolve over time as a consequence of
interaction within a corpus.

Clearly there are many problems to be solved:

how the component parts of such corpuses are to be identified, what the
interaction laws will look like, to what extent such corpuses are in fact
distinguishable from their social environments.

In the context of this

strategy of systems research in communication, I might add numerous attempts
to develop indices for systems properties such as the communication density,
the stability of a behavior, the mobility of members.

These are defined
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the components of an abstract system to be specified.
A third strategy of systems approaches to communication in complex
situations is to develop a set of analytical concepts which are in
principle derivable from mathematical systems models but are - because
of the difficulty of their formulation - measured directly on the object
under study.

This approach is promoted by what Rapoport calls soft defini-

tions of system,

In terms of this approach, one could study evolution, i.e.,

the slow higher order changes in organizational structure, as a communication channel between parent and offspring generations of a species which
takes place in the face of interaction with an environment.
be interpreted as noise,

Mutations can·

Based on common experiences, one can say that all

forms of organization interact with their respective environments so as to
maintain certain essential variables such as temperature or self-identity.
It has been shown that this property is related to circular flows of infor-

mation,

A usual problem is to delineate the boundary between an organiza-

tion, and its environment.

But once this is accomplished, numerous hypo-

theses can be tested in those terms,

For example, as the size of a social

organization increases, its boundary processes proportionally less information than is processed internally.

Carried to its logical conclusion, such

an inverse relationship would presumably shed light on optimal sizes of
social organization as a function of data processing facilities available
to them.

Cells, organs, organisms, groups, organizations., societies are

said to form hierarchies of subsystems.

This concept leads to the study

of various abstractions from information penetrating an organism at its
boundary and on the lowest level of abstraction.

One can assess the de-

coding capabilities of the boundaries of various organisms and test hypotheses
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as to which quantities of information would result in information overload
and how each level of organization reacts to this event.

Such questions

are very much associated with the work of Miller (1965~·1•=1.~~, 1971a, 1971b)
in whose systems approach the concepts of information and communication play
the most important roles,
The praxiological mode of inquiry into systems is focused on the manipulation and control of a portion of the real world,

When we talk loosely

about communication systems, we usually refer to some piece of technology
which is designed to mediate between certain selected parts of society that
would otherwise be independent or not interacting so strongly.

The imple-

mentation of communication technology - whether it be the postal service,
the mass media or the communication satelite

- creates complex dynamic inter-

dependencies which are increasingly difficult to study.

Another important

communication system is created by the use of computers in social organizations, not just for bookkeeping which replaces interpersonal communication
by a switching circuit, but also for storing large amounts of data or for
including for decision making
decision-making/Ion the communication pattern within the organization itself.
Clearly, such technology is designed and ultimately evaluated by someone
according to some criteria of utility.

But there are also other objects

of praxiological concern for communication:

studies aimed at improving

human relations by opening up certain channels of interpersonal communication
among the employees of a company; studies aimed at relieving people of their
poverty by bringing them into contact with work opportunities and knowledge
about their behavior relative to each other; studies aimed at making education in the classroom more efficient; and, finally, studies in psychotherapy
aimed at eliminating mental illnesses.

Knowledge about communication is
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h ere evaluated primarily according to whether it a llows an actor to influence
a process in question, whether "it works," whether the objective would
be obtained as a consequence, i.e., according to a criterion of utility.
On the praxiological level, available knowledge about communication
is even more limited .

The scope of mathematical models- of communication

is currently quite narrow and the conceptual frameworks implied by soft
systems definitions do not always lend itself to accurate predictions and
control .

In the face of the need to act upon a complex environment, the

strategy that has been followed usually involves, as a first step, the isolation and precise definition of a problem .

The corrnnunications engineer

could not start until the range of possible inputs and the transformation which he is to rea lize materially are well specified.

Similarly, a

psychotherapist could not start the treatment until he accepts a definition
of himself, of the patient's problem and of what constitutes his success .
It fol lows that the current state of praxiological knowledge about
communication often optimizes communication l ocally while creating unmanageable complex ity globally.

For example, the installation or improve-

ment of mass communication technology is certainly enjoyed by a majority ,
for whatever reason.

But this relatively simple one-way communication

technology also l inks up with or influences other communication pa tterns of
society which relate individuals in ways that had been evo lved slowly before
the excessive use of such technology.

In addition to creating l arge publics

and to coordinating - knowingly or not - the behavior of many individuals
towards specific topics , objects or people , complex webs of institutional
and interpersonal feedbacks are crea t ed which are pot yet fully understood.
We do not even know the u l timate danger of reor ganizing society a round the
invention of such corrnnunication technologies .

By way of analogy I would like

to point to the eco logical problems we face tod ay which a re caused by a

-37technological development that started a long time ago,

In the last

analysis, the reliance of communication technology is probably more
consequential than the use of chemicals which has polluted our water,
and the atmosphere as well as poisoned our food.

Therefore, unless

we learn to cope with large scale systems of which such technology is
a part we may well face a crisis that is more disastrous than what
we have experienced so far.
It should be noted that definitions of communication which link

the concept to some intentionality of the sender are wholly consistent
with the praxiological mode of inquiry into communication.

The

scientific mode of inquiry would regard this as a special case of
the transmission of information, one that is presumably explainable in
terms of circular flows of information of which the actor, claiming an
intention, is a part.

In terms of systems theory, it is easily seen

that the praxiological mode of inquiry always has some built-in narrowness,
it sacrifices understanding the large context in favor of controlling a
small part.

Perhaps this narrow focus is necessary for rational action.

But, particularly when the inquiry concerns complex processes of
social cormnunication, a consideration of systems that a.re as large

in scope as possible might be the only way of comprehending how we live.
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